Evaluation and strategic manipulation

Pablo Amoros

No 2022-01, Working Papers from Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center

Abstract: We consider the problem of a group of experts who have to rank a set of candidates. Society's optimal choice relies on experts?honest judgments about the deserving ranking. However, experts' judgments are impossible to verify. Moreover, experts' judgments do not entirely determine their preferences. Then, experts might want to misreport their judgments if, by doing so, some ranking that they like best is selected. To solve this problem, we have to design a mechanism where the experts interact so that the socially optimal ranking is implemented. Whether this is possible depends on (1) how experts' judgments are aggregated to determine the socially optimal ranking and (2) how experts' preferences relate to their judgments. We state necessary and su¢ cient conditions on these two elements for the socially optimal ranking to be implementable in dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium. Then, we study the implementability of some widely used judgment aggregation rules, including extensions of scoring and Condorcet consistent voting rules. Finally, we propose a non-trivial judgment aggregation rule that is Nash implementable.

Keywords: Evaluation; impartiality; manipulability; ranking of candidates; mechanism design; voting rules. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2022-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Evaluation and strategic manipulation (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mal:wpaper:2022-1

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