Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?

Jörg Oechssler, Andreas Roider and Patrick Schmitz

No 08-06, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoff period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.

Keywords: negotiations; ultimatum game; emotions; cooling-off; cognitive abilities; behavioral biases; internet experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C99 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2071/1/dp08_06.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? (2015)
Working Paper: Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (2009)
Working Paper: Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (2008)
Working Paper: Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2071

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