Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma

Nikos Nikiforakis (), Hans-Theo Normann and Brian Wallace

No 2009_20, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions, we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account, but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts.

JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_20

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