Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence

Stéphane Robin (), Agnieszka Rusinowska and Marie Claire Villeval

Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne

Abstract: We provide experimental evidence of worker's ingratiation by opinion conformity and of managers' discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions. In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers' performance at a task and opinions before assigning unequal payoffs. In the Ingratiation treatment, workers can change their opinion after learning that held by manager. In the Random treatment, workers can also change opinion but payoffs are assigned randomly, which gives a measure of non-strategic opinion conformism. We find evidence of high ingratiation indices, as overall, ingratiation is effective. Indeed, managers rewards opinion conformity, and even more so when opinions cannot be manipulated. Additional treatments reveal that ingratiation is cost sensitive and that the introduction of performance pay for managers as well as a less noisy measure of performance increase the role of relative performance in the assignment of payoffs, without eliminating the reward of opinion conformity

Keywords: Ingratiation; opinion conformity; favoritism; discrimination; social distance; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C92 D03 D86 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2012-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12032.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12032

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