How do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines

Austan Goolsbee and Chad Syverson

No 11072, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We examine how incumbents respond to the threat of entry by competitors (as distinct from how they respond to actual entry). We look specifically at passenger airlines, using the evolution of Southwest Airlines' route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly. We find incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by Southwest's entry. Over half of Southwest's total impact on incumbent fares occurs before Southwest starts flying. These cuts are only on threatened routes, not those out of non-Southwest competing airports. The evidence on whether incumbents are seeking to deter or accommodate entry is mixed.

JEL-codes: L1 L9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published as Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, 2008. "How do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(4), pages 1611-1633, November.

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Journal Article: How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines (2008)
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