Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis

Marco Battaglini and Stephen Coate

No 11495, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens (e.g., national defense or air quality) and the distributive spending is district-specific transfers (e.g., pork barrel spending). Investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policy-making periods. The analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices, focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of taxation and allocation of tax revenues. The model sheds new light on the efficiency of legislative policy-making and has a number of novel positive implications.

JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg and nep-sea
Note: PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published as Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 118-149, March.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis (2007)
Working Paper: Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis (2005)
Working Paper: Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis (2005)
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