Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con

Lars Svensson

No 11537, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The main result of Morris and Shin (2002) (restated in papers by Amato, Morris, and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) and commented upon by Economist (2004)) has been presented and interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more public information can be bad. However, some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances, more public information is good. Furthermore, for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and private information, social welfare is higher than in a situation without public information.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
Note: ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published as Svensson, Lars E. O. "Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con." American Economic Review Vol. 96, No. 1, Mar., 2006

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