Pillar 1 vs. Pillar 2 Under Risk Management

Loriana Pelizzon () and Stephen Schaefer

No 11666, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Under the New Basel Accord bank capital adequacy rules (Pillar 1) are substantially revised but the introduction of two new "Pillars" is, perhaps, of even greater significance. This paper focuses on Pillar 2 which expands the range of instruments available to the regulator when intervening with banks that are capital inadequate and investigates the complementarity between Pillar 1 (risk-based capital requirements) and Pillar 2. In particular, the paper focuses on the role of closure rules when recapitalization is costly. In the model banks are able to manage their portfolios dynamically and their decisions on recapitalization and capital structure are determined endogenously. A feature of our approach is to consider the costs as well as the benefits of capital regulation and to accommodate the behavioral response of banks in terms of their portfolio strategy and capital structure. The paper argues that problems of capital adequacy are minor unless, in at least some states of the world, banks are able to violate the capital adequacy rules. The paper shows how the role of Pillar 2 depends on the effectiveness of capital regulation, i.e., the extent to which banks can "cheat".

JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin, nep-fmk, nep-reg and nep-rmg
Note: AP ME
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Loriana Pelizzon & Stephen Schaefer, 2007. "Pillar 1 versus Pillar 2 under Risk Management," NBER Chapters, in: The Risks of Financial Institutions, pages 377-416 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11666.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11666

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11666

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().