The Effects of Cardiac Specialty Hospitals on the Cost and Quality of Medical Care

Jason R. Barro, Robert Huckman and Daniel P. Kessler

No 11707, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The recent rise of specialty hospitals -- typically for-profit firms that are at least partially owned by physicians -- has led to substantial debate about their effects on the cost and quality of care. Advocates of specialty hospitals claim they improve quality and lower cost; critics contend they concentrate on providing profitable procedures and attracting relatively healthy patients, leaving (predominantly nonprofit) general hospitals with a less-remunerative, sicker patient population. We find support for both sides of this debate. Markets experiencing entry by a cardiac specialty hospital have lower spending for cardiac care without significantly worse clinical outcomes. In markets with a specialty hospital, however, specialty hospitals tend to attract healthier patients and provide higher levels of intensive procedures than general hospitals.

JEL-codes: I1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hea
Note: EH
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Barro, Jason R. & Huckman, Robert S. & Kessler, Daniel P., 2006. "The effects of cardiac specialty hospitals on the cost and quality of medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 702-721, July.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11707.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The effects of cardiac specialty hospitals on the cost and quality of medical care (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11707

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11707

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().