Recent Chinese Buyout Activity and the Implications for Global Architecture

Agata Antkiewicz and John Whalley

No 12072, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We discuss recent cases of Chinese buyout activity in the OECD (especially in the US and the EU) in resource and manufacturing sectors. While most of the buyout attempts have been unsuccessful, they can serve as a catalyst for a wider discussion on the implications for global arrangements over cross border acquisitions. Three specific issues are discussed. The first is the subsidization of purchase raised in the OECD in response to the advancing of low- or no-interest loans by the Chinese Central Bank to companies investing abroad. The second is the transparency of entities involved in the buyout attempt. Most Chinese companies have close ties to the multiple levels of government and are not subject to the standard reporting requirements as required of OECD companies. The third involves national security concerns in the OECD and the possibility of acquiring sensitive technology by Chinese companies when they purchase companies abroad. These issues have not been addressed in the existing OECD/WTO investment policy initiatives and have yet to be discussed in the global fora.

JEL-codes: F02 F20 F21 O24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-tra
Note: ITI
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published as Whalley, John and Agata Antkiewicz. "Recent Chinese Buyout Activity and the Implications for Global Architecture." Canadian Public Policy 33, 2(June 2007): 207-226.

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