Antitrust in the Not-For-Profit Sector

Tomas Philipson and Richard Posner

No 12132, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Despite the conceptual differences between for-profit and non-profit firms stressed in conventional economic analyses of the non-profit sector, U.S. antitrust law generally does not distinguish between these two organizational forms. This paper argues that the same incentives to restrain trade exist in the non-profit sector as in the for-profit sector. Altruistic firms benefit from exploiting market power, just as non-altruistic ones do, even when they would price below cost without regard to competition. Therefore, promoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the particular objectives of producers, and the fact that antitrust law does not distinguish between the two sectors is efficient.

JEL-codes: K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-reg
Note: EH LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published as Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, 2009. "Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 1-18, 02.

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Working Paper: Antitrust and the Not-For-Profit Sector (2001)
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