Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model

Richard Freeman

No 12306, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The European Union and the United States operate different variants of market capitalism. The EU model uses social dialogue institutions to help determine economic outcomes, particularly in the labor market, whereas the US relies more on market forces. The theory of competitive markets provides a powerful framework for analyzing market driven economies and for assessing the conditions under which unfettered markets yield desirable outcomes. But there is no comparable framework for analyzing institution driven economies. This paper argues that models of efficient bargaining/the Coase Theorem offer the best framework for analyzing social dialogue economies and for identifying policies and institutional reforms to improve their functioning.

Date: 2006-06
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Published as Acocella, Nicola and Riccardo Leoni (eds.) Social Pacts, Employment and Growth: A Reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli's Thought. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2007.

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Chapter: Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model (2007)
Chapter: Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model (2007)
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