First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes

Janet Currie and W. Bentley Macleod

No 12478, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We examine the impact of tort reforms using U.S. birth records for 1989-2001. We make four contributions: First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort reforms. Second, we assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of outcomes. Finally, we allow for differential effects by demographic/risk group. We find that reforms of the "deep pockets rule" reduce complications of labor and C-sections, while caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Our results demonstrate there are important interactions between incentives created by tort law and other incentives facing physicians.

JEL-codes: I12 I18 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-law and nep-reg
Note: CH EH LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2008. "First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(2), pages 795-830, 05.

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