The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear

Gerard Padro i Miquel

No 12573, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power. In addition, they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending. I present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare. The fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favors another group is enough to discipline supporters. The model predicts extensive use of patronage, ethnic bias in taxation and spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased rent extraction by the leader. These predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance, ethnic bias, wasteful policies and kleptocracy in post-colonial Africa.

JEL-codes: D72 H2 O17 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Note: POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published as Padro i Miquel, Gerard. "The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear." Review of Economic Studies 74, 4 (October 2007): 1259-74.

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