Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets

Christopher Knittel and Victor Stango

No 12604, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors' deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account differentiation. Our empirical framework can empirically distinguish surcharging motivated by this strategic concern from surcharging that simply maximizes ATM profit considered as a stand-alone operation. The results are consistent with such behavior by large banks, but not by small banks. For large banks, the effect of incompatibility seems to operate through higher deposit account fees rather than increased deposit account base.

JEL-codes: K21 L1 L12 L4 L41 L44 L84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com and nep-law
Note: IO LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published as Knittel, Christopher and Victor Stango. "Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets." Journal of Banking and Finance. Volume 35, Issue 10, October 2011, Pages 2627-2636.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12604.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic incompatibility in ATM markets (2011)
Working Paper: Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets (2006)
Working Paper: Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12604

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12604

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().