The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century
Efraim Benmelech and
Tobias J. Moskowitz
No 12851, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth.
JEL-codes: G2 G38 N2 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-pol and nep-reg
Note: CF DAE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Published as Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2010. "The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1029-1073, 06.
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Journal Article: The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century (2010)
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