Strategic Judicial Decision Making

Pablo Spiller and Rafael Gely

No 13321, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This survey paper starts from the basic, and intuitive, assumption that judges are human and as such, can be modeled in the same fashion we model politicians, activists, managers: driven by well-defined preferences, behaving in a purposive and forward-looking fashion. We explore, then, the role politics play in judicial decision-making. We provide a brief overview of what is called the "strategic approach," compare it to alternative approaches to understand judicial behavior, and offer some concluding thoughts about the future of positive analyses of judicial decision-making.

JEL-codes: K0 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: LE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Strategic Judicial Decision-making Pablo T. Spiller and Rafael Gely The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics Print Publication Date: Aug 2008 Subject: Political Science, Law and Politics Online Publication Date: Sep 2009 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0003

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Working Paper: Strategic Judicial Decision Making (2007)
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