Rent Seeking and the Unveiling of 'De Facto' Institutions: Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil

Joana Naritomi, Rodrigo Soares and Juliano Assuncao

No 13545, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper analyzes the roots of variation in de facto institutions, within a constant de jure institutional setting. We explore the role of rent-seeking episodes in colonial Brazil as determinants of the quality of current local institutions, and argue that this variation reveals a de facto dimension of institutional quality. We show that municipalities with origins tracing back to the sugar-cane colonial cycle -- characterized by a polarized and oligarchic socioeconomic structure -- display today more inequality in the distribution of land. Municipalities with origins tracing back to the gold colonial cycle -- characterized by an over-bureaucratic and heavily intervening presence of the Portuguese state -- display today worse governance practices and less access to justice. The colonial rent-seeking episodes are also correlated with lower provision of public goods and lower income per capita today, and the latter correlation seems to work partly through worse institutional quality at the local level.

JEL-codes: N26 O17 O40 P14 P28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul, nep-dev and nep-his
Note: EFG
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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