Bank Failures in Theory and History: The Great Depression and Other "Contagious" Events
Charles Calomiris
No 13597, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Bank failures during banking crises, in theory, can result either from unwarranted depositor withdrawals during events characterized by contagion or panic, or as the result of fundamental bank insolvency. Various views of contagion are described and compared to historical evidence from banking crises, with special emphasis on the U.S. experience during and prior to the Great Depression. Panics or "contagion" played a small role in bank failure, during or before the Great Depression-era distress. Ironically, the government safety net, which was designed to forestall the (overestimated) risks of contagion, seems to have become the primary source of systemic instability in banking in the current era.
JEL-codes: E5 G2 N2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-his and nep-mac
Note: CF DAE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
Published as The Great Depression and Other ‘Contagious’ Events Charles W. Calomiris The Oxford Handbook of Banking Print Publication Date: Jan 2012 Subject: Economics and Finance, Financial Economics, Economic History Online Publication Date: Sep 2012
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