Bayesian Learning in Social Networks

Daron Acemoglu, Munther A. Dahleh, Ilan Lobel and Asuman Ozdaglar

No 14040, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a model of learning over a general social network. Each individual receives a signal about the underlying state of the world, observes the past actions of a stochastically-generated neighborhood of individuals, and chooses one of two possible actions. The stochastic process generating the neighborhoods defines the network topology (social network). The special case where each individual observes all past actions has been widely studied in the literature. We characterize pure-strategy equilibria for arbitrary stochastic and deterministic social networks and characterize the conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning -- that is, the conditions under which, as the social network becomes large, individuals converge (in probability) to taking the right action. We show that when private beliefs are unbounded (meaning that the implied likelihood ratios are unbounded), there will be asymptotic learning as long as there is some minimal amount of "expansion in observations". Our main theorem shows that when the probability that each individual observes some other individual from the recent past converges to one as the social network becomes large, unbounded private beliefs are sufficient to ensure asymptotic learning. This theorem therefore establishes that, with unbounded private beliefs, there will be asymptotic learning an almost all reasonable social networks. We also show that for most network topologies, when private beliefs are bounded, there will not be asymptotic learning. In addition, in contrast to the special case where all past actions are observed, asymptotic learning is possible even with bounded beliefs in certain stochastic network topologies.

JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-soc
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published as Daron Acemoglu & Munther A. Dahleh & Ilan Lobel & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2011. "Bayesian Learning in Social Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 1201-1236.

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Journal Article: Bayesian Learning in Social Networks (2011)
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