Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections

Alberto Alesina and Richard Holden

No 14143, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the candidates may wish to announce a range of policy preferences, rather than a single point. This strategic ambiguity balances voter beliefs about the appeal of candidates both to the median voter and to the campaign contributors. If primaries precede a general election, they add another incentive for ambiguity, because in the primaries the candidates do not want to reveal too much information, to maintain some freedom of movement in the policy space for the general election. Ambiguity has an option value.

JEL-codes: H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-upt
Note: POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14143.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14143

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14143

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().