Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-Making Systems: Evidence from the American Labor Market

Arindrajit Dube and Richard Freeman

No 14272, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between shared capitalist modes of pay and shared modes of decision-making via employee involvement and related committees and between them and measures of productivity and worker well-being in two data sets: the employee based Worker Participation and Representation Survey and the California Establishment Survey. It finds in both data sets that the forms of shared compensation are complementary in the sense that they are more likely to be found together than if firms chose them separately; that shared compensation systems are positively associated with shared decision-making; and that combining shared compensation systems and employee involvement has greater impacts on outcomes than each system by itself.

JEL-codes: J33 J54 L23 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-lab and nep-ltv
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Arindrajit Dube & Richard B. Freeman, 2010. "Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-Making Systems: Evidence from the American Labor Market," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 167-199 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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