Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq

Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter

No 14606, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop and test an economic theory of insurgency motivated by the informal literature and by recent military doctrine. We model a three-way contest between violent rebels, a government seeking to minimize violence by mixing service provision and coercion, and civilians deciding whether to share information about insurgents. We test the model using panel data from Iraq on violence against Coalition and Iraqi forces, reconstruction spending, and community characteristics (sectarian status, socio-economic grievances, and natural resource endowments). Our results support the theory's predictions: improved service provision reduces insurgent violence, particularly for smaller projects and since the "surge" began in 2007.

JEL-codes: F51 F52 H4 H43 H56 O12 O53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara
Note: IFM PE POL PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published as Eli Berman & Jacob N. Shapiro & Joseph H. Felter, 2011. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(4), pages 766 - 819.

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