Towards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement

Kyna Fong and Michael Schwarz

No 14718, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without distorting incentives for innovation.

JEL-codes: D44 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
Note: EH
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