EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates

Nazire Nergiz Dincer and Barry Eichengreen

No 14791, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present updated estimates of central bank for 100 countries up through 2006 and use them to analyze both the determinants and consequences of monetary policy transparency in an integrated econometric framework. We establish that there has been significant movement in the direction of greater central bank transparency in recent years. Transparent monetary policy arrangements are more likely in countries with strong and stable political institutions. They are more likely in democracies, with their culture of transparency. Using these political determinants as instruments for transparency, we show that more transparency monetary policy operating procedures is associated with less inflation variability though not also with less inflation persistence.

JEL-codes: E0 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
Note: IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (70)

Published as Theoretical Inquiries in Law. Volume 11, Issue 1, Pages 75–123, ISSN (Online) 1565-3404, DOI: 10.2202/1565-3404.1237, January 2010

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14791.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14791

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14791

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14791