Does Affirmative Action Lead to Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence

Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban Aucejo, Hanming Fang and Kenneth I. Spenner

No 14885, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We argue that once we take into account the students' rational enrollment decisions, mismatch in the sense that the intended beneficiary of affirmative action admission policies are made worse off could occur only if selective universities possess private information about students' post-enrollment treatment effects. This necessary condition for mismatch provides the basis for a new test. We propose an empirical methodology to test for private information in such a setting. The test is implemented using data from Campus Life and Learning Project (CLL) at Duke. Evidence shows that Duke does possess private information that is a statistically significant predictor of the students' post-enrollment academic performance. We also propose strategies to evaluate more conclusively whether the evidence of Duke private information has generated mismatch.

JEL-codes: D8 I28 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
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Published as Peter Arcidiacono & Esteban M. Aucejo & Hanming Fang & Kenneth I. Spenner, 2011. "Does affirmative action lead to mismatch? A new test and evidence," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), pages 303-333, November.

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Journal Article: Does affirmative action lead to mismatch? A new test and evidence (2011)
Working Paper: Does Affirmative Action Lead to Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence (2010)
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