Interviewing in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Robin Lee and Michael Schwarz

No 14922, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes the one-to-one matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion, and prove that unemployment is minimized with perfect overlap: i.e., if two firms interview any common worker, they interview the exact same set of workers.

JEL-codes: C78 D85 J01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-net
Note: LS
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Robin S. Lee & Michael Schwarz, 2017. "Interviewing in two-sided matching markets," The RAND Journal of Economics, vol 48(3), pages 835-855.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14922.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Interviewing in two-sided matching markets (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14922

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14922

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().