On the Self-interested Use of Equity in International Climate Negotiations

Andreas Lange, Andreas Löschel, Carsten Vogt and Andreas Ziegler

No 14930, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We discuss self-interested uses of equity arguments in international climate negotiations. Using unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we show that the perceived support of different equity rules by countries or groups of countries may be explained by their economic costs. Despite being self-interested, equity arguments may be perceived as being used for different reasons, for example, out of fairness considerations or in order to facilitate negotiations. Consistent with experimental and behavioral studies on fairness perceptions, we find that individuals are more likely to state reasons with positive attributes if they evaluate their own region or regions that support the individual's personally preferred equity rule. Negotiators perceive the use of equity by regions as less influenced by pressure from interest groups.

JEL-codes: D63 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
Note: EEE
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Published as Lange, Andreas & Löschel, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2010. "On the self-interested use of equity in international climate negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 359-375, April.

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Journal Article: On the self-interested use of equity in international climate negotiations (2010)
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