What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California's NOx Trading Program

Meredith Fowlie, Stephen Holland and Erin Mansur

No 15082, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A perceived advantage of cap-and-trade programs over more prescriptive environmental regulation is that enhanced compliance flexibility and cost effectiveness can make more stringent emissions reductions politically feasible. However, increased compliance flexibility can also result in an inequitable distribution of pollution. We investigate these issues in the context of Southern California's RECLAIM program. We match facilities in RECLAIM with similar California facilities also located in non-attainment areas. Our results indicate that emissions fell approximately 24 percent, on average, at RECLAIM facilities relative to our counterfactual. Furthermore, we find that observed changes in emissions do not vary significantly with neighborhood demographic characteristics.

JEL-codes: L5 Q52 Q53 R20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
Note: EEE IO
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published as Meredith Fowlie & Stephen P. Holland & Erin T. Mansur, 2012. "What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California's NOx Trading Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 965-93, April.

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Journal Article: What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California's NOx Trading Program (2012)
Working Paper: What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California’s NOx Trading Program (2009)
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