Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds

David Albouy

No 15224, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In a two-party legislature, districts represented by the majority may receive greater funds if majority-party legislators have greater proposal power or disproportionately form coalitions with each other. Funding types received by districts may depend on their legislators' party-identity when party preferences differ. Estimates from the United States - using fixed-effect and regression-discontinuity designs - indicate that states represented by members of Congress in the majority receive greater federal grants, especially in transportation, and defense spending. States represented by Republicans receive more for defense and transportation than those represented by Democrats; the latter receive more spending for education and urban development.

JEL-codes: H5 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-reg
Note: PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published as David Albouy, 2013 “Partisan Representation in Congress and the Distribution of Federal Funds.” Review of Economics and Statistics. 95(1), 127-141.

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Journal Article: Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds (2013)
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