International Trade and Domestic Regulation

Robert Staiger and Alan O. Sykes

No 15541, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Existing formal models of the relationship between trade policy and regulatory policy suggest the potential for a regulatory race to the bottom. WTO rules and disputes, however, center on complaints about excessively stringent regulations. This paper bridges the gap between the existing formal literature and the actual pattern of rules and disputes. Employing the terms-of-trade framework for the modeling of trade agreements, we show how "large" nations may have an incentive to impose discriminatory product standards against imported goods once border instruments are constrained, and how inefficiently stringent standards may emerge under certain circumstances even if regulatory discrimination is prohibited. We then assess the WTO legal framework in light of our results, arguing that it does a reasonably thorough job of policing regulatory discrimination, but that it does relatively little to address excessive nondiscriminatory regulations.

JEL-codes: F13 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-reg
Note: ITI
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as International Trade, National Treatment and Domestic Regulation (with Alan Sykes), Journal of Legal Studies, January 2011

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