Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty

Nicholas Burger and Charles Kolstad

No 15543, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The literature on voluntary provision of public goods includes recent theoretical work on the formation of voluntary coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition size. We find that contributions decrease when public good returns are uncertain but increase when individuals can form a coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good benefits are higher. Uncertainty has no effect on coalition size.

JEL-codes: C7 C91 C92 H23 H4 H41 Q5 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Note: EEE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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