Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs About Others

Rafael Di Tella and Ricardo Perez-Truglia

No 16645, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper we present the results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that the second player can accept a side payment that reduces the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to have the possibility of taking a larger proportion of the recipient's tokens, take more of them. They were also more likely to report believing that the recipient would accept a low price in exchange for a side payment; and selected larger numbers as their best guess of the likely proportion of recipients acting "unfairly". The results favor the hypothesis that people avoid altruistic actions by distorting beliefs about others.

JEL-codes: E62 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-soc
Note: POL
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Published as Rafael Di Tella & Ricardo Perez-Truglia & Andres Babino & Mariano Sigman, 2015. "Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism," American Economic Review, vol 105(11), pages 3416-3442.

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