A Political Theory of Populism

Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin

No 17306, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses "populist' policies - i.e., policies to the left of the median voter - as a way of signaling that he is not from the right. Truly right-wing politicians respond by choosing more moderate, or even left-of-center policies. This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing politicians; when politicians are indeed more likely to have a hidden right-wing agenda; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We show that similar results apply when some politicians can be corrupted or influenced through other non-electoral means by the rich elite. We also show that 'soft term limits' may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies.

JEL-codes: C71 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-lam and nep-pol
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

Published as Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2013. "A Political Theory of Populism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(2), pages 771-805.

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Political Theory of Populism (2013)
Working Paper: A Political Theory of Populism (2013)
Working Paper: A Political Theory of Populism (2011)
Working Paper: A Political Theory of Populism (2011)
Working Paper: A Political Theory of Populism (2010)
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