Vertical Integration and Optimal Reimbursement Policy

Christopher Afendulis and Daniel Kessler

No 17316, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Health care providers may vertically integrate not only to facilitate coordination of care, but also for strategic reasons that may not be in patients' best interests. Optimal Medicare reimbursement policy depends upon the extent to which each of these explanations is correct. To investigate, we compare the consequences of the 1997 adoption of prospective payment for skilled nursing facilities (SNF PPS) in geographic areas with high versus low levels of hospital/SNF integration. We find that SNF PPS decreased spending more in high integration areas, with no measurable consequences for patient health outcomes. Our findings suggest that subjecting integrated providers to higher-powered reimbursement incentives, i.e., less cost-sharing, may enhance medical productivity. More generally, we conclude that it may be efficient for purchasers of health services (and other services subject to agency problems) to consider the organizational form of their suppliers when choosing a reimbursement mechanism.

JEL-codes: I1 I11 I18 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
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Published as Afendulis, Christopher C., and Daniel P. Kessler. “Vertical Integration and Optimal Reimibursement Policy,” International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 11:3 (September 2011) 165-179.

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