The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages

Bard Harstad

No 17409, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A conservation good, such as the rainforest, is a hostage: it is possessed by S who may prefer to consume it, but B receives a larger value from continued conservation. A range of prices would make trade mutually beneficial. So, why doesn't B purchase conservation, or the forest, from S? If this were an equilibrium, S would never consume, anticipating a higher price at the next stage. Anticipating this, B prefers to deviate and not pay. The Markov-perfect equilibria are in mixed strategies, implying that the good is consumed (or the forest is cut) at a positive rate. If conservation is more valuable, it is less likely to occur. If there are several interested buyers, cutting increases. If S sets the price and players are patient, the forest disappears with probability one. A rental market has similar properties. By comparison, a rental market dominates a sale market if the value of conservation is low, the consumption value high, and if remote protection is costly. Thus, the theory can explain why optimal conservation does not always occur and why conservation abroad is rented, while domestic conservation is bought.

JEL-codes: D62 D78 F5 H87 Q15 Q23 Q27 Q30 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
Note: EEE LE PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Bård Harstad, 2016. "The market for conservation and other hostages," Journal of Economic Theory, .

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Journal Article: The market for conservation and other hostages (2016)
Working Paper: The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages (2013)
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