Competition in Persuasion

Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica

No 17436, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders’ preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.

JEL-codes: D83 L15 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-mic
Note: IO LE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published as Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Competition in Persuasion," The Review of Economic Studies, vol 84(1), pages 300-322.

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