The Private and Public Economics of Renewable Electricity Generation

Severin Borenstein

No 17695, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Generating electricity from renewable sources is more expensive than conventional approaches, but reduces pollution externalities. Analyzing the tradeoff is much more challenging than often presumed, because the value of electricity is extremely dependent on the time and location at which it is produced, which is not very controllable with some renewables, such as wind and solar. Likewise, the pollution benefits from renewable generation depend on what type of generation it displaces, which also depends on time and location. Without incorporating these factors, cost-benefit analyses of alternatives are likely to be misleading. However, other common arguments for subsidizing renewable power - green jobs, energy security and driving down fossil energy prices - are unlikely to substantially alter the analysis. The role of intellectual property spillovers is a strong argument for subsidizing energy science research, but less persuasive as an enhancement to the value of installing current renewable energy technologies.

JEL-codes: L94 Q42 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
Note: EEE IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published as Severin Borenstein, 2012. "The Private and Public Economics of Renewable Electricity Generation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 26(1), pages 67-92, Winter.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17695.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Private and Public Economics of Renewable Electricity Generation (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17695

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17695

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().