Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises

Atif Mian, Amir Sufi and Francesco Trebbi

No 17831, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Debtors bear the brunt of a decline in asset prices associated with financial crises and policies aimed at partial debt relief may be warranted to boost growth in the midst of crises. Drawing on the US experience during the Great Recession of 2008-09 and historical evidence in a large panel of countries, we explore why the political system may fail to deliver such policies. We find that during the Great Recession creditors were able to use the political system more effectively to protect their interests through bailouts. More generally we show that politically countries become more polarized and fractionalized following financial crises. This results in legislative stalemate, making it less likely that crises lead to meaningful macroeconomic reforms.

JEL-codes: G01 G33 G38 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: CF EFG POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 1-28, April.

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Journal Article: Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises (2014)
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