Public Procurement and the Private Supply of Green Buildings

Timothy Simcoe and Michael Toffel

No 18385, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We measure the impact of municipal policies requiring governments to construct green buildings on private-sector adoption of the U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard. Using matching methods, panel data, and instrumental variables, we find that government procurement rules produce spillover effects that stimulate both private-sector adoption of the LEED standard and supplier investments in green building expertise. Our findings suggest that government procurement policies can accelerate the diffusion of new environmental standards that require coordinated complementary investments by various types of private adopter.

JEL-codes: L15 O33 Q55 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
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Published as T. Simcoe and M. To el. Government Green Procurement Spillovers: Evidence from Municipal Building Policies in California. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 68(3):411{434. Lead article. (November 2014).

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