Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters

Jesse Rothstein

No 18419, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Recent proposals would strengthen the dependence of teacher pay and retention on performance, in order to attract those who will be effective teachers and repel those who will not. I model the teacher labor market, incorporating dynamic self-selection, noisy performance measurement, and Bayesian learning. Simulations indicate that labor market interactions are important to the evaluation of alternative teacher contracts. Typical bonus policies have very small effects on selection. Firing policies can have larger effects, if accompanied by substantial salary increases. However, misalignment between productivity and measured performance nearly eliminates the benefits while preserving most of the costs.

JEL-codes: I21 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-hrm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Jesse Rothstein, 2015. "Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(1), pages 100-130, January.

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Journal Article: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2015)
Working Paper: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2012)
Working Paper: Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters (2012)
Working Paper: Teacher quality policy when supply matters (2012)
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