How Is Power Shared In Africa?

Patrick Francois (), Ilia Rainer and Francesco Trebbi

No 18425, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper presents new evidence on the power sharing layout of national political elites in a panel of African countries, most of them autocracies. We present a model of coalition formation across ethnic groups and structurally estimate it employing data on the ethnicity of cabinet ministers since independence. As opposed to the view of a single ethnic elite monolithically controlling power, we show that African ruling coalitions are large and that political power is allocated proportionally to population shares across ethnic groups. This holds true even restricting the analysis to the subsample of the most powerful ministerial posts. We argue that the likelihood of revolutions from outsiders and the threat of coups from insiders are major forces explaining such allocations. Further, over-representation of the ruling ethnic group is quantitatively substantial, but not different from standard formateur premia in parliamentary democracies. We explore theoretically how proportional allocation for the elites of each group may still result in misallocations in the non-elite population.

JEL-codes: H1 O38 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-cdm, nep-dev and nep-pol
Note: POL DEV
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published as Patrick Francois & Ilia Rainer & Francesco Trebbi, 2015. "How Is Power Shared in Africa?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 465-503, 03.

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