Incentivizing China's Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities: The Role of the Central Government and Public Environmentalism

Siqi Zheng, Matthew Kahn, Weizeng Sun and Danglun Luo

No 18872, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: China's extremely high levels of urban air, water and greenhouse gas emissions levels pose local and global environmental challenges. China's urban leaders have substantial influence and discretion over the evolution of economic activity that generates such externalities. This paper examines the political economy of urban leaders' incentives to tackle pollution issues. Based on a principal-agent framework, we present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that both the central government and the public are placing pressure on China's urban leaders to mitigate externalities. Such "pro-green" incentives suggest that many of China's cities could enjoy significant environmental progress in the near future.

JEL-codes: H23 H41 Q48 Q53 R5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-res, nep-tra and nep-ure
Note: EEE PE POL
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Published as Regional Science and Urban Economics Volume 47, July 2014, Pages 61–71 SI: Tribute to John Quigley Cover image Incentives for China's urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities: The role of the central government and public environmentalism ☆ Siqi Zhenga, , Matthew E. Kahnb, , , Weizeng Suna, , Danglun Luoc,

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