Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs

Grant Miller and Kimberly Singer Babiarz

No 18932, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This chapter surveys experience with performance pay in developing country health programs. In doing so, it focuses on four key conceptual issues: (1) What to reward, (2) Who to reward, (3) How to reward, and (4) What unintended consequences might performance incentives create. We highlight that the use of performance pay has outpaced growth in corresponding empirical evidence. Moreover, very little research on performance incentives focuses on the underlying conceptual issues that we outline. We consider these to be important constraints to the design of better performance incentives in low- and middle-income country health programs.

JEL-codes: H51 I12 O12 O17 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-hrm and nep-ltv
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Published as Encyclopedia of Health Economics 2014, Pages 457–466 Cover image Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs G. Miller K.S. Babiarz

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