Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth

Erin M. Johnson and M. Rehavi

No 19242, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and financial incentives in physician induced demand (PID). Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable non-physicians. We exploit a unique institutional feature of California to determine how inducement varies with obstetricians' financial incentives. Consistent with PID, physicians are almost 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting of patients to hospitals or obstetricians. Financial incentives have a large effect on C-section probabilities for non-physicians, but physician-patients are relatively unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes, suggesting overuse of C-sections adversely impacts patient health.

JEL-codes: I10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-hrm
Note: CH EH
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Johnson, Erin M., and M. Marit Rehavi. 2016. "Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8(1): 115-41.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19242.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19242

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19242

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().