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Who Says Yes When the Headhunter Calls? Understanding Executive Job Search Behavior

Peter Cappelli and Monika Hamori

No 19295, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We examine an aspect of job search in the important context of executive-level jobs using a unique data set from a prominent executive search firm. Specifically, we observe whether or not executives pursue offers to be considered for a position at other companies. The fact that the initial call from the search firm, which we observe, is an exogenous event for the executive makes the context particularly useful. We use insights from the Multi-Arm Bandit problem to analyze the individual's decision as it emphasizes assessments of future prospects in the decision process, which are particularly relevant for executive careers. More than half the executives we observe were willing to be a candidate for a job elsewhere. Executives are more likely to search where their current roles are less certain and where their career experience has been broader. Search is more likely even for broader experience within the same employer. In the latter case, the array of likely opportunities is also broader, making search more useful.

JEL-codes: M12 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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