Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers

Shawn Cole, Martin Kanz () and Leora Klapper

No 19472, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We use an experiment with commercial bank loan officers to test how performance based compensation affects risk-assessment and lending. High-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending decisions. This effect, however, is muted by deferred compensation and limited liability, two standard features of loan officer incentive contracts. We find that career concerns and personality traits affect screening behavior, but show that the response to monetary incentives does not vary with traits such as risk-aversion, optimism or overconfidence. Finally, we present evidence that incentive contracts distort the assessment of credit risk, even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under permissive incentives are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.

JEL-codes: D03 G21 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-upt
Note: CF DEV
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as “Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers” with Shawn Cole and Leora Klapper. Journal of Finance 70 (2): 537-575, April 2015.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers (2015)
Working Paper: Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers (2012)
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