Rational Inattention and Energy Efficiency

James Sallee

No 19545, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: If time and effort are required to accurately ascertain the lifetime value of energy efficiency for a durable good, consumers might rationally ignore energy efficiency. This paper argues that such inattention may be rational in the market for automobiles and home appliances. To do so, it develops a heuristic model of a consumer's decision problem when purchasing an energy consuming durable good in which uncertainty about each good's energy efficiency can be resolved via costly effort. The model indicates under what conditions the consumer will be less likely to undertake this effort. The empirical portion of the paper argues that energy efficiency is often not pivotal to choice. This, along with a simulation of the automobile market, suggests that returns to paying attention to energy may be modest, and analysis of the information readily available to consumers suggests that the costs of being fully informed may be substantial. The paper discusses the implications of rational inattention for public policy and for empirical research on the energy paradox.

JEL-codes: D03 H23 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-reg
Note: EEE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

Published as James M. Sallee, 2014. "Rational Inattention and Energy Efficiency," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(3), pages 781 - 820.

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