Market-based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy

Stefano DellaVigna, Ruben Durante, Brian Knight and Eliana La Ferrara

No 19766, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: An extensive literature has studied lobbying by special interest groups. We analyze a novel lobbying channel: lobbying businessmen-politicians through business proxies. When a politician controls a business, firms attempting to curry favors shift their spending towards the politician's business. The politician benefits from increased revenues, and the firms hope for favorable regulation in return. We investigate this channel in Italy where government members, including the prime minister, are not required to divest business holdings. We examine the evolution of advertising spending by firms over the period 1994 to 2009, during which Silvio Berlusconi was prime minister on and off three times, while maintaining control of Italy's major private television network, Mediaset. We predict that firms attempting to curry favor with the government shift their advertising budget towards Berlusconi's channels when Berlusconi is in power. Indeed, we document a significant pro-Mediaset bias in the allocation of advertising spending during Berlusconi's political tenure. This pattern is especially pronounced for companies operating in more regulated sectors, as predicted. Using a model of supply and demand in the advertising market, we estimate one billion euros of extra revenue to Berlusconi's group. We also estimate the expected returns in regulation to politically motivated spenders of similar magnitude, stressing the economic importance of this lobbying channel. These findings provide an additional rationale for rules on conflict of interest.

JEL-codes: D73 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: IO LE LS PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published as Stefano DellaVigna & Ruben Durante & Brian Knight & Eliana La Ferrara, 2016. "Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 224-56, January.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19766.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy (2016)
Working Paper: Market-based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy (2014)
Working Paper: Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy (2014)
Working Paper: Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy (2014)
Working Paper: Market-based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19766

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19766

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().