Voting to Tell Others

Stefano DellaVigna, John List, Ulrike Malmendier and Gautam Rao

No 19832, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Why do people vote? We argue that social image plays a significant role in explaining turnout: people vote because others will ask. The expectation of being asked motivates turnout if individuals derive pride from telling others that they voted, or feel shame from admitting that they did not vote, provided that lying is costly. We design a field experiment to estimate the effect of social image concerns on voting. In a door-to-door survey about election turnout, we experimentally vary (i) the informational content and use of a flyer pre-announcing the survey, (ii) the duration and payment for the survey, and (iii) the incentives to lie about past voting. Our estimates suggest significant social image concerns. For a plausible range of lying costs, we estimate the monetary value of voting `because others will ask' to be in the range of $5-$15 for the 2010 Congressional election. In a complementary get-out-the-vote experiment, we inform potential voters before the election that we will ask them later whether they voted. We find suggestive evidence that the treatment increases turnout.

JEL-codes: C93 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-soc
Note: IO LS PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published as Stefano Dellavigna & John A. List & Ulrike Malmendier & Gautam Rao, 2017. "Voting to Tell Others," The Review of Economic Studies, vol 84(1), pages 143-181.

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Journal Article: Voting to Tell Others (2017)
Working Paper: Voting to Tell Others (2016)
Working Paper: Voting to Tell Others
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